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he stars were misaligned when Cyprus took over from the efficient Danish Presidency 
of the Council of the European Union in the second half of 2012. On June 25th, only a 
week before the start of its Presidency, the government of Cyprus, led by the largely 
unpopular  Communist  politician  Dimitris  Christofias,  was  forced  to  ask  for  a  bailout 
package  (representing  more  than  half  of  the  island’s  GDP)  to  salvage  its  ailing  banking 
system. Cyprus was the fifth eurozone member to do so (after Greece, Portugal, Ireland and 
Spain), but the first when taking on the rotating Presidency, which severely undermined its 
credibility to act as the Council’s honest broker on issues of economic reform and financial 
stability. Another irritant was posed by Turkey’s boycott of the Cyprus Presidency, which 
not only froze efforts to resolve the decades-old dispute over the divided island but also had 
a negative if limited impact on EU-Turkish relations in general. Finally, inherent obstacles to 
running  the  Presidency  were  posed  by  the  geographical  remoteness  of  the  island  from 
Brussels and the size of the administration of this third-smallest EU member state. Given 
these daunting obstacles, the low level of expectations and the high level of apprehension, it 
is perhaps surprising that the Cyprus Presidency managed to score a number of positive 
results at all. Arguably, this is largely due to perpetual motion of the EU legislature, but also 
thanks to Cyprus’ pragmatic approach to the job. 
Main priorities and results 
Any proper assessment of an individual EU Presidency is fraught with difficulties because 
the  work  of  the  Council  transcends  the  six-month  rotational  scheme  and  priorities  are 
nowadays set for three successive Presidencies (the so-called ‘trio’). In the second half of 
2012,  three  priorities  stood  out:  concluding  a  deal  on  the  long-term  EU  budget  and  the 
multiannual  financial  framework  2014-2020,  strengthening  economic  governance  and 
finalising  negotiations  on  the  Common  European  Asylum  System.  In  essence,  Cyprus 
thereby tried to wrap up the work carried out by its predecessors in the trio, Poland and 
Denmark. A specific focus on solidarity between member states (e.g. through the cohesion 
policy) set Cyprus’ agenda apart from the trio’s programme.  
On  the  bright  side,  the  Council  agreed  in  December  to  set  up  a  Single  Supervisory 
Mechanism,  following  an  extraordinary  ECOFIN  meeting  instigated  by  the  Presidency, 
drawing on the earlier roadmap tabled in October after that month’s European Council. The 
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agreement signified a crucial and very substantive step towards completion of the banking 
union and a timely step forward in the integration of financial supervision for the euro area. 
Furthermore, by aptly negotiating with the European Parliament, disagreements over the 
Commission’s proposal were papered over and an impasse on the EU budget 2013 talks was 
averted in time. Other successes included the adoption by the Council of two regulations 
with a view to implementing enhanced cooperation between 25 member states in the area of 
the  creation  of  unitary  patent  protection,  the  adoption  of  the  Credit  Rating  Agencies  III 
Directive,  and  the  closing  of  chapters  in  accession  negotiations  with  Iceland  and 
Montenegro, despite the enlargement fatigue that has been prevailing in Europe the last few 
years.  In  the  realm  of  EU  external  action,  the  Presidency  replaced  HR/VP  Ashton  on  a 
number of occasions, in December, for instance, by briefing the European Parliament on the 
Middle East Peace Process and by chairing the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council. 
However, most of these successes were overshadowed by a failure to reach a deal on two of 
the  Presidency’s  priorities.  First,  Cyprus  proved  unable  to  reconcile  stark  differences 
between  member  states  on  the  multiannual  financial  framework  2014-2020.  Its  revised 
‘negotiation box’ that foresaw strategic cuts was met by harsh criticism from Parliament’s 
rapporteurs,  who  argued  that  it  “sends  out  a  very  bad  signal  when  it  comes  to  policy 
priorities” in terms of stimulating competitiveness, growth and employment. To add to the 
frustration, European Council President Van Rompuy largely abandoned the proposal on the 
eve of the European Council of November. Sadly, Van Rompuy’s own proposal to the heads 
of states and governments could not avert the postponement of a deal until well into 2013. 
Secondly, the Cyprus Presidency failed to conclude negotiations on the Common European 
Asylum System before its self-imposed deadline of the end of 2012, mainly because the EP 
did  not  agree  with  the  Council  on  the  rules  concerning  the  use  of  the  asylum  seekers’ 
fingerprint database. Other failures include the inability to advance preparations on reform 
of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (the  examination  of  proposals  was  part  of  the  trio’s 
agenda), in a large part due to the lack of financing in absence of the long-term EU budget.  
Compensating for small size and lack of experience 
Overall, the balance sheet is mixed. Observations of previous post-Lisbon Presidencies apply 
to  that  of  Cyprus  as  well.  Whereas,  the  Presidency  remains  an  important gatekeeper  for 
passing  EU  legislation,  its  visibility  and  influence  are  limited  nowadays:  the  wolves 
(politicians) are expected to dance the waltz (be an honest broker), while there is no obvious 
reward.1 For instance, in the context of the eurozone crisis, decisions are increasingly taken 
by  the  Eurogroup,  which  is  not  chaired  by  the  Presidency.  Denmark  and  Poland  both 
suffered from this as non-eurozone countries, while Cyprus itself was the object of unwanted 
attention.  The  potential  influence  of  the  Presidency  on  these  issues  was  eclipsed  by  the 
return of ‘Big Three’ politics to the EU, even if the dynamics between Berlin, London and 
Paris are different than before. In the protracted eurozone crisis, decision-making is largely 
defined by the power of the purse, with Germany holding the strings, albeit reluctantly. 
France has always felt pro-EU by destiny, and will remain so if new arrangements do not 
lower  its  own  standing.  David  Cameron’s  strategy  for  Britain’s  relations  with  the  EU, 
however, has thrown a spanner in the works of the informal triumvirate. As the African 
proverb goes, when the elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. In the current economic, 
financial and political climate, there is little that a small and new member state Presidency 
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can accomplish, other than keeping bread-and-butter issues on the right track and achieving 
a few minor ‘priorities’. The Cyprus Presidency was not an exception.  
The  decision  to  have  a  ‘Brussels-based’  Presidency,  with  many  of  Cyprus’  civil  servants 
operating  from  the  EU’s  headquarters,  was  a  pragmatic  solution  to  overcome  obvious 
limitations  in  administrative  capacity.  Generating  political  momentum  on  controversial 
issues by touring through national capitals has proven difficult for Cyprus. The ability of a 
small Presidency to notch up individual successes and to act as a corrective instrument to big 
member states’ politics relies largely on the extent to which it can position itself inside the 
institutional  triangle  between  the  Commission,  Parliament,  and  the  President  of  the 
European  Council.  As  the  Parliament  has  gained  competences  in  more  policy  areas, 
maintaining good relations with the EP has become more important for a successful run of 
the  Presidency.  Given  the  ideological  differences  between  Van  Rompuy,  a  Christian 
Democrat, and Christofias, a Communist, expectations of a productive relationship on that 
axis were rather low.  
Yet, the Cyprus Presidency has been able to make significant progress on a number of issues. 
Also, its bureaucracy and diplomatic service have been given a chance to gain some valuable 
experience in European affairs. In dealing with the preparations towards the Presidency, 
Cyprus  has  shown  resilience  by  agreeing  to  pragmatic  solutions  with  its  predecessor. 
Illustrative of this ingenuity and cooperation were Cyprus’ chairing of some working groups 
related to defence (where Denmark received an opt-out) in the first half of 2012, where the 
Danes  continued  chairing  the codex  alimentarius  working  group  (in  which  Cyprus  lacked 
expertise) in the second half of 2012. The number of these so-called ‘seconded officials’ was, 
however,  more  limited  than  is  usually  the  case  with  smaller  presidencies.  Still,  in  these 
respects, the Cyprus Presidency might serve as a model for small and new member states 
that are slated to hold the Presidency in the future, such as Lithuania (end 2013), Latvia 
(early 2015) and Malta (early 2017). 
 